16 SEPT 1970

1 OF 1

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

16 September 1970 (VOL. XXI, NO. 37)

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONTENTS

CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONTENTS (Continued)

SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY

Prague Belatedly Rebuts Attack on Dubcek Ouster
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Provinces Urge Drive for Economic Gains to Greet NPC 40 Inner Mongolia, Kweichow, Szechwan Radios Remain Silent

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FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 SEPTEMBER 1970

Moscow (3934 items)			Peking (2665 items)		
Nonalined Conference in Lusaka	e (1%)	8%	Domestic Issues [CCP Central	(19%) ()	41% 25%]
DPRK National Day	()	7%	Committee Plenum		
Indochina	(17%)	6%	Indochina	(50%)	21%
[Vietnam	(15%)	5%]	[Alliance Delegation	()	4%]
Middle East	(4%)	5%	in PRC		
Bulgarian National	(0.1%)	5%	[DRV National Day	(34%)	5%]
Day			[Cambodia	(8%)	5%]
China	(5%)	5%	DPRK National Day	()	11%
Brezhnev Speech in	()	3%	Nonalined Conference	()	6%
Uzbekistan	, ,		in Lusaka	, ,	٠
Tank Troops Day	()	3%	Ceylon Economic Delega- tion in PRC	()	4%
			Middle East	(4%)	3%
			USSR-FRG Treaty	()	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or aditorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Attacks on U.S. Vietnamization policy, the "enlarged" war in Laos, and the "aggression" in Cambodia are repeated in propaganda pegged to activities of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee (VFFCC) in Hanoi. This propaganda includes remarks by VWP First Secretary Le Duan to an enlarged conference of the VFFCC on 9 September as well as by President Ton Duc Thang at the conference and at a meeting held on the 8th to commemorate the Front's 15th anniversary (10 September.) Routine attacks on U.S. Vietnamization policy as well as on alleged U.S. attempts to negotiate from a position of strength were also repeated at the 83d session of the Paris talks on 10 September.

Vietnamese communist media hail the presence at the Lusaka nonalined conference of the PRG "delegation" in the capacity of "official observer" as a diplomatic success and say that PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh was "warmly acclaimed." LPA on 16 September reports her arrival in Paris on the 14th. A number of statements by Sihanouk's private secretariat and the FUNK claim support for the Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) at the nonalined conference, without acknowledging that no Cambodian delegation was admitted.

An economic delegation led by DRV Vice Premier Nguyen Con arrived in Peking on the 12th to negotiate an agreement on economic and military aid for 1971. Presumably this is the first leg of the annual tour of a DRV economic delegation, in the past headed by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, to conclude aid agreements with major communist states.

The Chinese stand on Indochina continues to be assailed in the course of Soviet polemical comment on the PRC. Other Moscow propaganda routinely scores U.S. policy, with foreign-language commentaries by Aleksey Leontyev on the 12th and 13th claiming that the United States is still counting on a 'military solution' and refusing to discuss the question of troop withdrawal and a coalition government at the Paris talks.

VIETNAM FATHERLAND FRONT MEETINGS REVIEW INDOCHINA WAR

ANNIVERSARY

CELEBRATIONS

Routine charges against the U.S. Vietnamization

program, the U.S. "special war" in Laos, and the

"war of aggression" in Cambodia were voiced at

an 8 September meeting marking the 15th anniversary—on 10 September—

of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF). Hoang Quoc Viet, member of

CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030039-0

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 2 -

the VFF Presidium, also scored the United States for "continuing to dodge" discussion of a way to solve the South Vietnam problem correctly on the basis of the NFLSV/PRG 10-point program at Paris. He called routinely for an unconditional U.S. withdrawal and for allowing the South Vietnamese people to settle their internal affairs without foreign interference, claiming that if the United States would do this "peace would be immediately restored."

Scoring U.S. stubbornness, Viet called on the people to "further heighten their determination to fight and win and persevere in and step up their military, political, and diplomatic struggles." He added that in building socialism in the North, the people must "further develop the spirit of enduring hardships and overcoming all difficulties." Viet predictably stressed the role of the Front in strengthening solidarity and unity over the past 15 years, noting that the party has always considered the "great national union bloc" an important factor in guaranteeing victory for the revolution.

The anniversary meeting, reported by Hanoi media on the 9th, was held jointly by the Fatherland Front Central Committee and its Hanoi committee. Among members of the meeting's presidium, according to the radio account, were President Ton Duc Thang, chairman of the VFFCC Presidium, VWP First Secretary Le Duan, and VFFCC Presidium members including Truong Chinh and Hoang Quoc Viet. Opening remarks were delivered by Ton Duc Thang, who hailed the Fatherland Front "for ever more closely uniting" the people and contributing to the anti-U.S. struggle and the building and defense of the North. He stressed the Front's determination to strengthen the "all-people solidarity" and resolve to unite with the Laotian and Cambodian people and "perseveringly step up the anti-U.S. struggle militarily, politically, and diplomatically."

An anniversary appeal from the VFF Central Committee was read at the meeting and broadcast by Hanoi on the 11th, and a 10 September NHAN DAN editorial hailed the success of the Front in "enlarging and consolidating the all-people unity bloc."

FATHERLAND FRONT ENLARGED SESSION

U.S. policies were also assailed at an enlarged conference of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee--the

20th such meeting—held in Hanoi from 7 to 9 September under the chairmanship of Ton Duc Thang. VWP First Secretary Le Duan addressed the meeting; he has not attended such conferences in recent years, although he was present at the VFF anniversary

Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIACROPESTIVE TO SEPTEMBER 1970

- 3 -

celebrations in 1965. The 10 September Hanoi radic report on the meeting indicated that others present included VFF Presidium members Truong Chinh, Hoang Quoc Viet, Chu Van Tan, Phan Ke Toai, Nguyen Xien, and Tran Dang Khoa.

As at the last previous enlarged session, Ton Duc Thang made opening remarks and Tran Dang Khoa read the VFF Presidium's political report.* Additional reports were given by a VPA representative on the "great victories of the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian peoples during the first six months of the year" and by a State Planning Committee representative on "implementation of the state plan during the first six months of the year and on the trend of the state plan for the last six months."

In his opening remarks, Ton Duc Thang said that the conference was held to "review the situation during the first half of the year and set forth new tasks and duties." He routinely hailed the "many new, great, and glorious victories" of the Vietnamese people in both zones and claimed that the Indochinese people's struggle is "facing a new and very favorable situation." Charging that the United States is "very stubborn and crafty," he urged the people to "strengthen unity and heighten their determination to carry out the slogan 'everything for defeating the U.S. aggressors and for the success of socialist construction.'" The conference, he said, "will strongly encourage the northern people to focus their efforts on fulfilling their urgent tasks, reinforcing the North, and fulfilling the great rear's duties toward the great frontlines."

The VFF Presidium's political report, read by Tran Dang Khoa, says the Indochinese people have strengthened their solidarity and led their "resistance into a new phase." It hails Cambodian and Laotian military exploits, and it claims that the Laotians—"in coordination with the Cambodian and South Vietnamese battle-fields"—have enlarged their "liberated areas from northern to

^{*} In recent years the VFF Central Committee has met semiannually—once in the spring and once in the fall. The 19th enlarged session was held on 1 April 1970. Tran Dang Khoa delivered the major report at that meeting, although VFF presidium member Hoang Quoc Viet had read them at previous ones.

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 4 -

southern Laos" and linked them "with the vast liberated areas in the northeastern part of Cambodia and with the highlands of Vietnam." The report pledges support and assistance for the Indochinese people.

LE DUAN Hanoi media on the 12th released Le Duan's remarks REMARKS to the conference; he addressed the gathering on the 9th, according to VNA. Le Duan reportedly highlighted the role of the national united front and analyzed the situation of the anti-U.S. resistance throughout the country and of socialist construction in the North. VNA, but not Hanoi radio, reports him as stating that the Vietnam Fatherland Front, together with the NFLSV, "will strengthen national unity" and. along with the National United Front of Kampuchea and the Lao Patriotic Front, will "build an invincible united front of the peoples of Indochina." As usual, Le Duan predicted defeat of the Vietnamization program and stressed that the Vietnamese are dedicated to peace but determined to carry on the fight. He declared that "time is working against the U.S. aggressors" and that the three peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos will be victorious.

DELEGATES AT PARIS TALKS REPEAT CHARGES OF U.S. INFLEXIBILITY

The VNA and LPA accounts of the 83d session of the Paris talks on 10 September briefly summarize the statement by PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien, who spoke first, but Liberation Radio broadcasts the full text.* Tien began by citing the U.S. delegate's statements that the people of South Vietnam should be able to determine their future without interference, use of force or the threat of force. He then proceeded to document his charge that the United States has been a party to a policy of force against the people of Vietnam for the past 15 years. Castigating the U.S. stand that the origins of the war should not be debated, Tien asked how the problem can be solved without examining "the real nature of the use of force." The United States and "notody else," he said, must put an end to its use of force by ending its "aggressive" war and totally and unconditionally withdrawing its forces from South Vietnam.

^{*} Liberation Radio has been inconsistent in its recent treatment of the PRG statements; it broadcast the 6 and 13 August statements textually but ignored the next three.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 5 -

The PRG delegate, in response to the American delegate's stated desire to discuss specific matters in a practical way and through all available means, asked the U.S. side how it is prepared to reply to demands for an unconditional allied troop withdrawal and for establishment of a provisional coalition government, as well as to the PRG's stated readiness to reach an understanding with the other parties on concluding agreements to end the war. "I am waiting for the U.S. delegate's appropriate answers," Tien said, adding that if the American negotiator "only repeats his previous replies," the conclusion will be that the United States is not prepared to join in the effort to achieve a genuine peace.

The VNA account of Xuan Thuy's brief statement notes his complaint that although Ambassador Bruce's statements at the meetings contain nothing new, he spoke as if the United States were "'flexible'" and the PRG-DRV side were "'rigid' and made 'propaganda.'" The account also notes Xuan Thuy's repetition of his attack the previous week on the U.S. pursuit of Vietnamization, "'negotiations from strength,'" and the Nixon Doctrine. He went on to argue that flexibility is shown not by the U.S. policies but by the "logical and reasonable" PRG/NFLSV 10-point solution.

The account does not record Thuy's comments in response to Bruce's charge that the communist side was engaging in propaganda at the meetings. Thus, there is no notation of Xuan Thuy's accusation that the United States makes propaganda by waging aggression while it talks about assistance and peace and by being rigid while "pretending to be flexible." VNA reports that Thuy said "it is time that the United States change its policy and show good faith in these negotiations."

VNA dismisses the remarks of allied ambassadors Bruce and Lam in the single statement that they "kept repeating the aggressive and traitorous stand of the United States and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration."

ISSUE OF VIETNAMESE, CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATION AT LUSAKA

THE PRG Vietnamese communist media belatedly laud the presence of PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh at the Lusaka conference, reporting that she is there as head of the PRG "delegation" which is attending as an "official observer," as agreed upon by the conference participants.

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16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 6 -

While NCNA on the 8th had reported her arrival the day before, the first available Front report was an item on 11 September which also reviewed her speech on the 10th. Liberation Radio and VNA comment that her speech, in which she denounced U.S. "aggression" in South Vietnam and reiterated the PRG's "correct stand and good will" regarding a settlement, was "warmly welcomed." TASS on the 10th briefly reported her speech but did not mention her "observer" status. Vietnamese communist media claim that the delegation's presence was a "diplomatic success" for the PRG, pointing out that Mme. Binh was warmly acclaimed by "chiefs of state and premiers of more than 50 countries." A Liberation Radio commentary adds that the "Thieu-Ky clique" has shown itself to be "very confused" and has "accused the conferees of being partial."

NCNA reported that Mme. Binh left Lusaka on 11 September without mentioning her destination. LPA on the 16th reports her return to Paris on the 14th.

THE RGNU NCNA has carried a number of statements by Sihanouk's private secretariat and the FUNK praising the support for the RGNU delegation to the Lusaka nonalined conference in "voting" by the conferees on the question of admitting a Cambodian delegation.* There is no explicit acknowledgment of the fact that no Cambodian delegation was admitted to the conference.

A FUNK Political Bureau "communique," carried by NCNA on 10 September, said that the question of Cambodian seating was discussed by the foreign ministers on 6 and 7 September and that in the "voting" 21 countries favored the RGNU delegation, seven opposed it, and 12 favored leaving the Cambodian seat vacant. The communique called this a "new political and diplomatic victory" for the FUNK and the RGNU which showed "the complete isolation and total failure of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh traitorous clique and its masters, U.S. imperialism."

A statement by Sihanouk's private secretariat, carried by NCNA on the 11th, said that in a message to the Khmer people the day before Sihanouk refuted "lies" spread by the Phnom Penh Foreign Minister Koun Wick in a "recent" press conference to

^{*} The foreign ministers discussed the Cambodian seating question, expressing their position in speeches on 6 and 7 September, but apparently no vote was taken.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 7 -

the effect that more than 20 countries would support the Lon Nol regime at the conference. It pointed to the 'outstanding and very important victory" won by the RGNU, citing figures on the "voting." On the 13th NCNA reported that Sihanouk's secretariat released a cable sent by Sarin Chhak, the head of the RCNU delegation in Lusaka, again reporting the results of the "voting"--which it said took place at 2100 hours on 7 September-and adding that the conferees decided to "submit the result of the voting for decision by the heads of state meeting on September 8" when the conference opened. The cable added that the result would be considered "a great victory for us" even if the conference decided to leave the seat vacant. Another cable from Sarin Chhak, dated the 12th and carried by NCNA on the 14th, briefly reported on the session of the 19th. Chhak asserted that the majority of the speakers supported Sihancuk's delegation on the question of Cambodian representation.

On 12 September NCNA reported that the RGNU delegation left Lusaka that day without mentioning its destination.

SIHANOUK CONTINUES TO DENY STATEMENTS BY "FALSE" RADIO

Sihanouk continues to deny statements attributed to him by what he calls the "false" FUNK radio allegedly set up by the CIA. The RGNU statement, first carried by NCNA on the 8th, regarding a broadcast of a "fabricated" Sihanouk statement concerning "so-called intervention by 'North Vietnamese' troops in Cambodia," was followed by a "special message" from Sihanouk to the Khmer nation. Carried by NCNA on 10 September and publicized by the Hanoi and FUNK radios on the 12th, the message warns the people that this radio broadcasts fake Sihanouk messages and fake RGNU commentaries and urges them to be vigilant against such distortions of the truth. It cites as an example the broadcast of a "so-called message" of Sihanouk "acknowledging that 'Vietnamese communists' maltreated the people and Buddhist monks and damaged or destroyed monasteries."

Another allegedly false broadcast is repudiated in a FUNK radio "official communique" dated the 10th and carried by the Hanoi and FUNK radios on the 11th. The communique cites AFP for an 8 September report that Lon Nol's military spokesman had released to the press a "fake" statement by "Head of State" Sihanouk criticizing "the Soviet Union regarding the Soviet-Chinese border problem," charging that "the Soviet Union has

- 8 -

prevented the Head of State from returning home, and so forth."*
It calls this an "extremely brazen fabrication" by the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique and the CIA aimed at undermining the "friendly solidarity" of the Khmer people with the Chinese and Soviet peoples and at sowing doubts among the Khmer people's friends.

On the 13th NCNA carried a RGNU statement, also dated the 10th, which more cryptically refutes the alleged Sihanouk statement "reported by a press agency accredited to Phnom Penh" in which Sihanouk "violently attacked the Soviet Union." The statement condemns this act by which "the CIA tries to split the anti-imperialist forces" and conceal the defeats of the "Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique," and it recalls that the RGNU had previously denounced CIA schemes in its statement of the 8th. The FUNK radio carries this statement on the 14th, and VNA summarizes it on the 13th.

CLAIMS OF "BIG" VICTORY OF CAMEODIAN PLAF IN KOMPONG SPEU

The alleged exp sits of Cambodian patriotic forces in the Srang subsector of Kompong Speu Province from 29 August to 3 September are hailed in a 13 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, carried by Hanoi radio on the same day. Liberation forces during this period are said to have put out of action nearly 1,300 enemy troops and destroyed or heavily damaged four battalions, a brigade command post, and the government district administration. The engagement, according to QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, was a "heavy blow to the enemy, further shaking the enemy defense line west and southwest of Phnom Penh and posing a serious threat to the Lon Nol regime right in its last refuge."

The DRV army paper also claims that "big victories" in July and August have driven the "undisciplined" Lon Nol army into a state of "imminent collapse" which cannot be prevented no matter how much the United States and GVN assist Cambodia, either with combat air support or troops.

^{*} In a departure from its usual practice of disseminating statements by Sihanouk or his spokesman, NCNA did not carry this "communique"--perhaps because it discussed the sensitive issue of the Sino-Soviet border.

- 9 -

DRV DELEGATION ARRIVES IN PEKING FOR TALKS ON AID AGREEMENT

What is presumably the annual tour of a DRV delegation to conclude aid agreements with major communist states began on 12 September with the departure from Hanoi of an economic mission led by Vice Premier Nguyen Con, a member of the North Vietnamese party (VWP) Secretariat and chairman of the State Planning Commission. The delegation was seen off by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, a VWP Politburo member, who has regularly headed such delegations since 1965.* As was the case last year, the DRV ambassador to China, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, and Vice Minister of National Defense Tran Sam are listed as deputy leaders of the delegation to the PRC. Nguyen Con is not known to have visited other communist countries in recent years, but AFP reported that he headed an economic delegation to Sweden in September 1969. VNA on 11 July 1968 made the first known identification of Nguyen Con as a member of the Secretariat.

NCNA's reports on the Nguyen Con delegation's departure from Hanoi and arrival in Peking indicate that it is coming to China "for a friendly visit at the invitation" of the PRC Government; and, as was the case last year, only VNA's reports add that the delegation is in China for "negotiations on economic and military aid for 1971." As usual, the delegation was met at the airport by PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and feted at a banquet given by Li the following day. In addition, according to NCNA, Nguyen Con and Li held talks on the 13th "in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere" and the delegation met with Chou En-lai on the 15th for "a very cordial, friendly conversation." A similar meeting with Chou last year had been described by NCNA as "cordial and friendly."

Peking media acknowledge the specific purpose of the delegation's visit only in reporting the text of Nguyen Con's speech at the 13 September banquet. He remarked that "our current visit and talks about China's economic and military aid to the Vietnamese

^{*} Last year the economic mission, headed by Le Thanh Nghi, began its tour in Peking on 17 August but returned to Ha i for Ho's funeral in the first week of September and did not inally conclude an agreement with the PRC until 26 September. It went on to other countries, returning to Hanoi on 25 November. Previous tours to conclude aid agreements took place in May-July 1968, July-October 1967, August-October 1966, December 1965-January 1966, and June-July 1965.

people in 1971 will further strengthen the militant unity and friendly relations and cooperation between our two parties and two peoples." (In the past DRV media have occasionally been more candid than Peking in noting the nature of aid agreements between the two countries, although Peking as well as Hanoi reported that a supplementary aid agreement signed in Peking on 25 May this year included military as well as economic aid.)

MOSCOW CONTINUES ROUTINE ATTACKS ON PRC'S INDOCHINA STAND

Moscow continues to include attacks on the Chinese stand on Indochina in routine-level polemical attacks on the PRC. A 13 September commentary in Mandarin over Radio Peace and Progress, referring to the CCP plenum communique, claims that "Peking leaders" said the USSR and United States are "scheming" to dominate the world. The broadcast cites Vietnam as one example to refute the charge, noting that Pham Van Dong has said the DRV receives "great and invaluable support and assistance" from the USSR. Stating that the Soviet Union and the United States have opposing policies on Vietnam, the commentary says that to equate the two is "a distortion of reality" and an "insult to the Vietnamese people, who maintain close and friendly relations with the Soviet Union."

A 12 September Moscow radio broadcast in Mandarin, pointing to the Soviet desire for normalization of relations with the PRC, recalls the history of Sino-Soviet cooperation and once again recalls that the "joint action" of the two countries "compelled the imperialists to sit down to talks and sign the 1954 Geneva agreements which brought peace to the people of Indochina."

HANOI PROTESTS U.S. AIR STRIKE ON DRV, ALLIED "WAR CRIMES"

Hanoi radio on 16 September reported a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest of that date which condemns the United States "for dispatching" U.S. planes "to drop demolition and steel-pellet bombs on a number of populated areas" in Le Thuy district, Quang Binh Province. The spokesman routinely demanded an end to all U.S. violations of DRV sovereignty and security. Also on the 16th, Hanoi radio claimed that a U.S. unmanned reconnaissance plane was downed by the local armed forces and people of Vinh Phu Province the day before. The alleged downing brings Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes to 3,361 as of 15 September.

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16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 11 -

"WAR CRIMES"

COMMUNIQUE

VNA on 14 September released a communique issued by the DRV War Crimes Commission whic' denounces alleged U.S. crimes in both North and South

Vietnam during August. In the South, the communique scores alleged U.S. tactical and B-52 air raids and U.S. and ARVN ground sweeps and operations. It also charges that the GVN naval forces have increased their activities. The communique routinely enumerates U.S. reconnaissance activities in North Vietnam and cites alleged B-52 and tactical air raids on Vinh Linh area, as well as tactical air raids on Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces. It scores the alleged spraying of toxic chemicals along the demarcation line "just as the wind was blowing to the North," as well as U.S. artillery attacks from the 7th fleet and south of the demilitarized zone on the northern part of the DMZ. It further charges U.S. ships with violating DRV territorial waters.

LE DUAN DISCUSSES LABOR AND PRODUCTION PROBLEMS, EXPORT NEEDS

Hanoi radio reported on 13 September th. VWP First Secretary Le Duan recently addressed workers at the Hanoi-Hue-Saigon bus-building factory, the first in Hanoi to fulfill the 1970 state plan--four months ahead of schedule. While praising the workers for this accomplishment, Le Duan went on to note that the percentage of work done manually in many factories is "still very high" and to urge all workers to "struggle" to increase mechanized production "by at least 50 percent and more." He emphasized that production must keep pace with population growth and fill export requirements.

Going beyond the usual propaganda exhortations to increase production of export commodities, Le Duan linked this task with Hanoi's need for imports. "Only by increasing exports," he said, "will we be able to import raw and semifinished materials and manufacturing equipment." He cited Bulgaria as an example of a small country which exports many goods, including a high percentage of industrial products and machines.

Turning to the DRV's problems with labor management and discipline, Le Duan called for implementation of the productive labor movement, one of Hanoi's major campaigns this year. Specifically, he urged the workers to work eight hours at high output and called on factories to insure three production shifts a day; he also decried "sluggishness in labor and production, a lack of resourcefulness, and the habit of following old methods in performing work and of not thinking of

- 12 -

rationalizing production and improving technology."
Advocating that workers continue to study, Le Duan cited the example in the DPRK where, he said, he has learned the workers put in 12 hours a day—eight hours in factories, two hours in study, and two hours in social activity. He added that "in our country, it is necessary to better organize studies in factories" and to enliven study movements among workers.

Noting that cadres in factories must care for the workers' livelihood, Le Duan told the workers they must understand "that we have had to fight . . . for 25 years, that we have not yet scored many achievements in construction and that our country has been devastated by the war, and that our life, therefore, still meets with difficulties and the general level of our livelihood is still low." He reminded them that the "entire country is still in a state of war," that sacrifices and fighting must continue, and that the interests of the community and nation must be constantly placed above individual concerns.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 13 -

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow continues to maintain that the UAR has not violated the cease-fire agreement by introducing new missile installations into the "ez Canal zone. Propaganda notes that UAR "defensive devices" were established there prior to the cease-fire period and acknowledges that "minimal" measures have since been taken, including redeployment of "individual" missile installations to insure the security of the missile positions and personnel. Moscow's only acknowledgment that the violations had been taken up with the USSR comes in the domestic service roundtable on the 13th when a panelist cites the U.S. press to the effect that Washington is trying to persuade the USSR to make Egypt "put right" the violations.

Moscow again displays ambivalence in criticizing the United States, expressing "astonishment" at official statements "allegedly confirming" UAR violations and claiming that Israel has forced Washington's hand, but also calling the reported decision to sell Israel 16 to 18 more Phantoms a new and dangerous step. Moscow notes that Secretary Rogers, appearing before a Senate appropriations subcommittee on the 12th, said the United States will be deciding shortly on additional aid to Israel. And it views this as a sign that Tel Aviv's shopping list will get a favorable reception when Israeli Prime Minister Meir arrives in the United States for talks with President Nixon on 18 September.

Comment deplores the arms issue as further complicating Ambassador Jarring's mission. At the same time, Moscow surfaces the idea of new conditions for an agreement on talks: Laptev in the 11 September IZVESTLYA disparages the notion, as raised in Israel, but stops short of ruling it out. TASS, reporting remarks by UAR Foreign Minister Riyad on the 14th and 15th, cites him as saying that in view of U.S.-Israeli obstruction of Jarring's mission and the work of the four-power talks, the UAR feels it is imperative that the Big Four consultations be "activated" to achieve implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

UAR "REDEPLOYMENT" OF MISSILES NOT A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION

The first acknowledgment in Soviet propaganda of the UAR's "redeplcyment" of existing missile installations came in the Vasilyev RED STAR article on the 9th, broadcast in Arabic. Vasilyev cited the "UAR memorandum" to the United States—first mentioned by Moscow on 7 September and never released by Cairo media—in saying that the

- 14 -

Egyptian side "has the full right to carry out the redeployment of existing missile installations in the Suez Canal zone" to avoid an Israeli strike. Other propaganda repeatedly points to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir as "threatening," in a Swedish interview, that Israel may "resume aggression" against the UAR.

Laptev in his article in the morning edition of IZVESTIYA on the 11th is more specific in referring to the "minimal" measures undertaken by the UAR. Like Vasilyev, Laptev says the UAR memorandum emphasizes that Egypt has not introduced new missile installations into the Suez Canal zone since the cease-fire began. He adds that

the UAR has not effected any transfers of missile positions within the 50-kilometer zone stipulated by the terms of the agreement. The measures being implemented by the UAR in this zone are limited to work on maintaining old positions in the proper condition. Israel and the United States are endeavoring to pass off as violations of this agreement those minimal measures—including individual transfers of missile installations from one place to another and the replacement of certain installations there by others—which are essential for insuring the security of the missile positions and the personnel.

Laptev says that Tel Aviv "openly declares that it reserves the right to take the necessary measures" in the canal zone, and he adds that Mrs. Meir, in the interview with the Swedish EXPRESSEN, declared that these measures "imply Israeli military action against UAR missile installations." Laptev also states that Israel and the United States do not deny that U.S. "offensive weapons" continue to be supplied to Israel.

A commentator on the 13 September domestic service roundtable program argues, in turn, that UAR weaponry in the Suez Canal zone is defensive, and says it seems that there are persons in the United States who would like the UAR to remain "completely without cover." Panelist Druzhinin cites TIME as describing the military objects "discovered by U.S. and Israeli intelligence" in the 32-mile zone where "military actions were to be frozen." Noting that TIME said Egypt had placed ground-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery there, Druzhinin does not deny the statement, but maintains that TIME and other U.S. journalists know the difference between offensive and defensive weapons: "The air defense system cannot be classified as an offensive weapon, ground-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery cannot qualify as offensive weapons."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 15 -

SOVIET ROLE IN "RECTIFICATION"

Like Laptev in IZVESTIYA, who views with "astonishment" the "dizzy changes" in U.S. diplomacy, roundtable panelist Dmitriyev is "amazed"

at the "change of tune" in official U.S. statements. Dmitriyev in effect provides Moscow's first propaganda acknowledgment that the Soviet Union has been approached in connection with the violation charges: There is an attempt in the United States, he says, to shift the blame for present events in the Middle East from the culprit to the innocent, and "even to blame our own country." He cites the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR as saying that "Washington is at present supposed to be engaged on the critically important task of persuading the Soviet Union of the need to make Egypt put right the violations in the Suez Canal zone." These attempts, he adds, are "clearly addressed to the wrong party; the Soviet Union is not a participant in the Middle East conflict." It is not the USSR and the UAR, Dmitriyev says, but Israel that is building up armaments.

The commentator deplores alleged attempts "in Washington circles" to make "far-reaching inferences from current events in the Middle East." And he cites as an example NEWSWEEK's saying that "if the Soviet Union does not show itself cooperative in exerting pressure on the UAR," all the foundations of the "peace talks with the Soviet Union on which Nixon places his hopes and toward which he is supposedly striving will be undermined." It must be "categorically stated," Dmitriyev declares, that "statements of this kind are most unwise" and only lead to a "considerable complication" of the entire international situation.

ISRAELI VIOLATIONS

Laptev and other propagandists accuse Israel of cease-fire violations by reconstructing the Bar-Lev line on the eastern side of the Suez

Canal and building new fortifications there. Mcscow's domestic service on the 15th makes what is apparently the first Soviet propaganda reference to air surveillance of the Israeli side of the canal, citing Cairo's AL-AHRAM as pointing out that the United States has not reacted in any way to the "air reconnaissance photography data and other documents supplied by Cairo" which prove "continuous violations" by Israel. The photographs, the broadcast says, show work done by the Israelis to "fortify the so-called Bar-Lev line."

A TASS English dispatch on the 16th from New York cites the New York TIMES as reporting that the United States has evidence that Israel has been violating the cease-fire agreement. TASS notes construction of new and strengthening of old fortifications and building up of military equipment, including artillery, along the Suez Canal. And it adds that, according to the TIMES, U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 16 -

officials "tried to dismiss Israel's violations of the cease-fire agreement as 'insignificant,'" while at the same time taking steps to increase Israel's military potential. TASS does not mention, as reported in the TIMES on the 16th, that the violations include reconnaissance flights over Egyptian territory.*

INCREASED U.S. ARMS AND TECHNICAL AID TO ISRAEL DEPLORED

Citing U.S. press reports on the supply of more Phantoms to Israel and the training of Israeli troops in other weaponry, Moscow complains that Israel has shown no sign of giving up its "aggressive aims" and the United States is encouraging its position. At the same time, propagandists still underscore the UAR's wish for a peaceful settlement and there continue to be calls for implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

TASS on the 16th reports the State Department spokesman as being "forced to make the admission" at a press conference that "U.S. 'civilian' technical specialists are staying in Israel and training military personnel." He was responding, TASS says, to a question in connection with a Baltimore SUN report that a group of U.S. Air Force specialists had been sent to Israel to train Israeli pilots in operation of Shrike missiles. State Department confirmation of the "fact that U.S. specialists participate in training the Israeli armed forces" again indicates accelerated steps by Washington aimed at a further Israeli military buildup, TASS says. On the 15th, TASS cited the Washington POST as emphasizing that the United States is going to step up the military buildup "irrespective of whether the temporary cease-fire is maintained or not." The report notes a TIME report that Israeli military specialists are attending an electronic warfare course in the United States, benefiting "from American 'experience'" in Vietnam.

Other TASS dispatches rave pointed to reports by Congressmen that Israel has sent the U.S. Defense Department the largest arms request in history, that Mrs. Meir on her visit will be seeking more arms as well as donations from "U.S. Zionist organizations," and that Secretary Rogers told a Senate appropriations subcommittee that a

^{*} The cease-fire terms say that "to bolster the honoring of the cease-fire, each side will rely on its national means, including reconnaissance planes which will be free to operate unhindered up to a distance of 10 kilometers from its side of the cease-fire line."

- 17 -

decision will be taken soon on additional aid to Israel in view of its "serious economic difficulties."

An Orekhov article in PRAVDA on the 12th, commenting on the "unusual haste" with which Washington is preparing to fulfill the "obligations it has just assumed" regarding delivery of a further 18 Phantoms, observes that despite its talk of wishing to restore peace in the Middle East the United States is taking "new and dangerous steps." This "new and dangerous" deal, he says, can only lead to a major complication of the situation in the Middle East and make Ambassador Jarring's mission "even more difficult."

MOSCOW CITES UAR ON STATUS OF JARRING TALKS, BIG FOUR ACTION

TASS on the 16th reports UAR Foreign Minister Riyad as saying at his press conference the previous day that the United States has "brought its own initiative to an end." Referring to Riyad's "earlier" statement—an interview with AFP on the 14th—TASS cites him as saying that the United States and Israel had obstructed Jarring's mission and impeded the work of the fourpower talks, and that the UAR feels it has become imperative to activate the Big Four talks to implement the November 1967 Security Council resolution. TASS' brief report on the 15th of the AFP interview does not include Riyad's statement, quoted by Cairo media, that the Big Four must take the initiative in giving new directives to Jarring. And the Cairo versions made no mention of his additional remark, quoted by AFP, that "we have already made contacts in this regard."

Moscow has made no reference to U Thant's suggestion, in his annual report to the UN General Assembly, for a summit meeting of world leaders during the General Assembly to discuss the Middle East situation.

ISRAEL ON Laptev in his 11 September IZVESTIYA article, comNEW ACCORD plaining of Israel's action in not participating in
the Jarring contacts, charges that Israel is trying
to create "an atmosphere of Israeli diktat" over the New York talks.
Laptev thus disparages—but steps short of ruling out—the idea he
says is being raised in Israel that since the present contacts are
in danger of a complete breakdown, it might be time to work out an
agreement. "based on quite other conditions." He notes that
Israeli Transport Minister Peres stated that Israel "left the
door open for talks on a new cease-fire agreement."

- 18 -

USSR CONVEYS DISAPPROVAL OF PALESTINIAN HIJACKING

Soviet propaganda continues to cite Arab criticism of the hijacking and destruction of Pan American, TWA, Swissair, and BOAC
aircraft to demonstrate Moscow's own disapproval of such actions.*
And in comment assailing Israel for "retaliatory" mass arrests
of Arabs, Moscow denounces the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PF'P), perpetrator of the hijackings, as a "leftist
adventurist" group.

The brief initial Moscow reports on the 9th, all picking up critical remarks by the Cairo AL-AKHBAR, were published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 10th with one editorial change; whereas the initial TASS report merely said "an explosion" had occurred aboard the PanAm 747 at Cairo airport, the press accounts acknowledged destruction of the aircraft and, by implication, the perpetrators. The press version reported that the plane had been seized in the air by "several Palestinian partisans" and flown to Cairo. After all aboard had been ordered to leave the plane, this version ran, the Boeing 747 "was burned on the runway at Cairo airport as a result of the explosion of several bombs with time mechanisms." RED STAR carried the TASS reports on the 11th.

Moscow domestic service broadcasts on the 10th and 12th gave brief, selective accounts of developments, attributed to AFP and REUTERS. The item on the 10th revealed that the PFLP was demanding the release of "three of their comrades imprisoned in Switzerland" in exchange for the passengers detained in Jordan and that "Arab par ingers" had been taken to Amman. It accused REUTERS of trying to give the impression that "almost all Arabs" were in sympathy with "partisans" who seized aircraft, and that Cairo papers had rebutted these "fabrications." The broadcast on the 12th reported the destruction that day of the three aircraft at the desert field by the Palestinian "partisans"; it said that all women and children passengers would be freed only when "a decision is taken on the release of several Arab partisans previously arrested in Switzerland, Britain, and West Germany." TASS roundups giving substantially the same information were published in PRAVDA and RED STAR on the 13th.

^{*} Peking, while maintaining its usual flow of praise for Palestinian exploits, has not been heard to mention the hijackings. While North Korean media have also apparently been silent, PFLP leader Habbash was still visiting Pyongyang on the 13th, according to KCNA reports. And the chief of staff of the DPRK army was reported by FATAH, organ of the largest fedayeen organization, as having visited Fatah bases on the 14th, according to a Syrian news agency report the following day.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 19 -

A Bragin review in PRAVDA on the 13th again pointed to Arab criticism of the hijackings, remarking that these actions along with recent "armed clashes" in Jordan had aggravated tension in the Middle East. The Arab countries have made it clear that such hijackings "only complicate the cause" of the Arabs' just struggle, Bragin said, while Tel Aviv and "some Western capitals" try to use this question as a pretext to torpedo a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. Also on the 13th, TASS and the domestic service reported that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Central Committee in a statement on the 12th had condemned the PFLP for the hijacking and destruction of the three aircraft and the retention of 40 passengers. The TASS item noted that the PLO had suspended the PFLP from the Central Committee, denounced the conduct of the Front's leadership, and decided to cease cooperating with it.

ISRAELI Domestic service broadcasts on the 14th seized on ARRESTS reports of Israel's "mass arrests" of Arabs on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip to assail both Israel's "wave of terror" and the "extremist" Palestinians' "piratical actions in the air." The radio's Cairo correspondent, Rassadin, said Israel was stepping up "terror" against the peaceful population "under the totally false pretext of retaliation against the actions of the extremists" who hijacked several civil aircraft last week. Rassadin recalled that the hijackings were "sharply condemned" by the Arab countries and by Palestinian organizations, the PLO declaring that such actions only played into the hands of imperialist forces.

The first substantial Soviet comment comes in a domestic service talk by Ryzhikov later on the 14th. He charged that Tel Aviv, "with Washington's support," attempted to accuse all Arab governments which support the struggle by "genuine" Palestine patriots for restoration of the Palestinian people's rights. He added that Washington, not satisfied with calling on Arab ambassadors for explanations to the State Department, sent the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean "threatening to invade Jordan, on whose desert the extremists" landed the hijacked aircraft. Moscow had hitherto made no mention of U.S. press speculation on the use of force to release the passengers, reports of the arrival at Incirlik, Turkey, of U.S. C-130s for possible evacuation, and White House spokesman Zeigler's assurance on the 11th that Sixth Fleet movements were routine.

- 20 -

Again pointing to Arab condemnation of the hijackings, Ryzhikov explicitly mentioned PFLP head George Habbash, head of the "left-ist adventurist group," in noting that the PFLP had been expelled from the PLO and the "extremists have found themselves completely isolated in the Arab world." Arab patriots, he said, believe that terrorism is being substituted for "genuine struggle" against the Israeli occupation, and this harms the international prestige of the Palestinian resistance and the entire cause of Arab unity. He found it "still more dangerous" for peace in the Middle East that the "extremist forces in Israel" have not been called to order but instead have been given freedom of action and "unconditional U.S. support." Assailing the "extremist general" Dayan as the "de facto dictator" of Israel, Ryzhikov expressed astonishment at the "eagerness" of the White House to meet all of Dayan's demands.

WHITE HOUSE Moscow has not acknowledged the 14 September White STATEMENT House statement which declared that the holding of U.S. citizens as hostages is totally unacceptable to the U.S. Government and rejected the establishment of distinctions among U.S. citizens on any basis whatsoever. Moscow likewise fails to report the PFLP statement to which the White House statement was responsive. As reported by Jerusalem radio, a PFLP spokesman in Amman had said on the 14th that U.S. hostages would be considered Israelis and held until Israel agreed to exchange them for Palestinian detainees.

USSR NOTES FORMATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN JORDAN

TASS promp ly and briefly reports King Husayn's 16 September designation of Brigadier General Muhammad Dawud to form a provisional military government, and the appointment of Marshal Habis al-Majali as commander in chief of the armed forces and military governor of Jordan. TASS also notes that martial law has been imposed on the country and cites Amman radio as saying the military government is designed to put an end to army-guerrilla clashes and restore peace in Jordan.

Moscow since 2 September, when in reported the apparent assassination attempt against Husayn, has followed the situation in Jordan with a series of brief items, chiefly by TASS.* Dispatches have reflected

^{*} See the FBIS TRENDS of 2 September, pages 22-23, for a review of recent Soviet treatment of Jordanian events.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 21 -

the recurrent army-fedayeon clashes and the short period of relative calm. Carefully ever-handed, TASS has noted meetings between government officials and fedayeen leaders to work out measures to normalize the situation, and has reported appeals and instructions by both sides to their respective forces to cease fighting. In general, Moscow has confined itself to factual accounts, refraining from attributing the upheavals to outside forces or imperialist machinations.

In two instances—a TASS item on 7 September and a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast the following day—Moscow blamed the events on "U.S. intelligence" activities in Jordan. TASS cited the Beirut paper ASH—SHAB for the charge that many U.S. Embassy staff members are CIA agents carrying out activities aimed at preventing a Middle East settlement which would be in the interests of the Arabs, and at aggravating differences between Jordan, Syria and Iraq "to weaken the "eastern Arab front." (This is apparently Moscow's first reference to the dispute among the Arab "confrontation countries" over the "eastern front," a question which revolves primarily around the role and control of the Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan.*) TASS quoted the Beirut paper as saying that the recent bloodshed in Jordan shows the time has come to clear the country of CIA agents and other "subversive elements" who "stand behind these events."

The Radio Peace and Progress broadcast, in English to Africa, gave no attribution for a somewhat more detailed story of intelligence activities by U.S. Embassy officials "spying against the Palestinian organizations." Citing unspecified "observers," the broadcast charged that "CIA agents, disguised as American diplomats, have direct connections" with the bloody events in Jordan. Neither the TASS nor the Peace and Progress items was broadcast in Moscow's domestic or Arabic-language services.

Since then, the only such reference came in a 10 September TASS item citing a communique of the Palestine resistance movement's central committee, broadcast by Baghdad radio, as placing responsibility for the armed clashes on "reactionary elements instigated by Western intelligence services."

^{*} Affirming Iraq's support for the fedayeen, Iraqi Vice President Hardan Abd al-Ghaffar pledged on 2 September, according to a Baghdad broadcast, that the Iraqi army would "remain on the front" to support the fedayeen and would oppose any attempt to strike at fedayeen action. The IRAQI NEWS AGENCY-but not Moscow sources-reported on 14 September that Iraqi Defense Minister Shihab would leave the next day for Moscow for "medical tests and treatment."

- 22 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING ASSAILS SOVIETS; MOSCOW CONFIRMS AMBASSADOR TO PRC

The atmosphere of good will for which Brezhnev appealed on 28 August has been clouded by a harsh Chinese assault on Moscow as Soviet comment continues to cast doubt on Peking's sincerity in seeking a normalization of relations. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 13 September belatedly assailed the Soviet-FRG treaty--signed more than a month earlier--as a "gross betrayal" by "the Soviet revisionist clique" and a "monstrous fraud" designed to cover up the aggressive character of the Soviet Union, West Germany, and the United States.

Moscow's rejoinders to Peking's anti-Soviet thrusts have expressed concern over a lack of Chinese good will in responding to Soviet appeals for improved relations. Moscow has confined such polemical responses to its broadcasts to the Chinese, but Soviet irritation surfaced in the daily press in reaction to the recent CCP plenum communique's call for anti-Soviet struggle. A brief report carried on 11 September observed without elaboration that the communique contained "the usual anti-Soviet attacks."

The anniversary of Kosygin's meeting with Chou En-lai on 11 September last year has passed without notice by either side, except for a Mandarin broadcast over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 10th which recalled the meeting and noted that the talks which began the next month "are continuing" in Peking. The broadcast also mentioned that a session of the joint river navigation commission opened on 10 July this year; there has been no announcement on the progress of these talks since they opened. The Peace and Progress broadcast sounded a recurrent note in recent Soviet comment in mentioning the Peking talks and deploring the negative attitude shown in Chinese polemics. Soviet comment does . t, however, charge the Chinese with obstructionist tactics at the talks themselves, going no further than Brezhnev's remark that the talks are proceeding slowly.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIANRDP \$5 TA 0875 R000300 P3 P0 3 Pπ 2 NDG 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 23 -

While Soviet comment censures the Chinese for taking a negative approach, one step toward normalizing relations has been confirmed for the first time in Soviet media. TASS on 16 September announced the appointment of Vasiliy Tolstikov, Leningrad party boss and CPSU Central Committee member, as ambassador to the PRC. There has been no announcement of appointment of a Chinese ambassador.

PEKING DENOUNCES SOVIET-FRG TREATY AS BETRAYAL

Peking's major assault on the Soviet-FRG treaty consists of the authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, an accompanying NCNA report, two items of "reference material" on the German question carried in NCNA's domestic service, and a reprint of a long Albanian article which draws implications for China from the treaty signing. Peking denounces the treaty as a betrayal of the GDR, as an encouragement to West German "militarism," and as another example of the "collusion and contention" between the Soviet and U.S. superpowers in seeking spheres of influence.

Playing on the interests of hardliners in East Europe, particularly in the GDR, the Commentator article claims that Moscow has retreated from former demands for West German recognition of the GDR and has tacitly acceded to Bonn's terms regarding reunification and West Berlin. Peking has also sought to play on fears of resurgent German power, drawing a menacing picture of revived militarism in West Germany and dismissing the Brandt government's peacemaking initiatives as "more cunning and vicious" methods of penetrating East Europe. The NGNA report gets in a malicious dig by likening Hitler's invasion of Poland—illustrating the frailty of a treaty—to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The denunciation of the treaty pursues Peking's long-standing opposition to detente politics and incorporates its current line of attack on the superpowers for exercising undue influence in such areas as Europe and the Middle East. The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator calls the treaty a part of "the diabolic 'global Munich' scheme" of the Soviet Union and the United States. "To divide spheres of influence and contend for hegemony in Europe," according to Commentator, the two superpowers are acting "just as they do in the Middle East and other parts of the world." Commentator draws on historical experience in Europe to argue that the division of spheres of influence "through bartering away the

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 24 -

novereignty of small nations" does not bring peace and security. The NCNA report drives the point closer to home to the East Germans by accusing the Soviets of bargaining with West Germany over GDR territory in discussing the Berlin access question.

Peking's comment does not draw any implications for Chinese security, but NCNA on 12 September earlied the text of a lengthy Albanian editorial (in the 22 August ZERI I POPULLIT) which charges that the treaty was part of "the Soviet-U.S. global strategy" of preserving spheres of influence in Europe and "directing the edge of aggression at Asia." On 14 August NCNA had reprinted an Albanian denunciation of the treaty as designed to free the Soviets for a confrontation with the PRC.

Apart from the long reaction time, Peking's attack on the treaty is similar to its treatment of Soviet-FRG contacts last December which led to the treaty signing. At that time a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article and a companion NCNA article--released two weeks after the fact, normal reaction time for this sort of comment--interrupted a period of polemical restraint toward the Soviets. Peking's abstention from direct comment on the treaty signing for a month seemed consonant with its propaganda standdown in recent weeks and may also have reflected sensitivity to the interests of East Europeans whom the Chinese have been cultivating.* As for developments in Sino-Soviet relations during this period, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev arrived in Peking on 15 August as the new head of the Soviet delegation at the talks, the border river navigation talks continued, and Brezhnev delivered the conciliatory 28 August speech in which he explicitly rebutted speculation that the treaty with the FRG freed the Soviet Union to increase pressure on China. Peking has not mentioned Brezhnev's speech.

In addition to renewing old charges against Moscow on the German question, Peking's portrayal of West German revanchism and militarism is analogous to its effort to depict a revival of Japanese militarism. A hint of this line of attack on the

^{*} See the TRENDS of 2 September 1970, page 30, for a discussion of Peking's treatment of the German question during visits by Romanian delegations this summer.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIC TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 25 -

Soviet-FRG treaty was contained in a speech by Li Hsien-nien on 2 September in which he accused the Soviet Union and the United States of reviving "Japanese militarism" and "West German revanchism." As the attack on the treaty illustrates, Peking has interwoven its campaign against the superpowers with a portrayal of a growing threat from Japan and West Germany as heirs of aggressive traditions and now collaborators of the two major powers.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 26 -

LUSAKA CONFERENCE

MOSCOW APPLAUDS ANTI-IMPERIALIST THRUST OF NONALINED MEETING

Hailing the outcome of the 8-10 September nonalined conference in Lucaka, Zambia as "an important" contribution to national liberation struggles, Moscow presses its own definition of nonalinement as anti-imperialist in essence and by implication anti-Western, as it had done after the second nonalined meeting in Cairo in 1964. Soviet commentaries predictably play up anti-Western sentiments expressed at the conference and the censure of U.S. policies in the Middle East, Indochina, and southern Africa. Expressions of gratification that the conference was not "diverted from its anti-imperialist course" argear to reflect satisfaction at the absence of any critical treatment of Soviet policies and particularly of any allusion to Czechoslovakia in the conference documents.

Typical of the Soviet reaction is an 11 September TASS commentary by Kharkov which says the "successful" conclusion of the conference showed that "the nonalined countries are determined to develop the anti-imperialist struggle and to rally all forces opposing imperialism and aggression." Kharkov points especially to the conference calls for "immediate" U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from "occupied Arab territories." A Radio Moscow broadcast in English to South Asia on the 11th noted that the conference delegates "sharply criticized U.S. and British imperialist policies" and characterized the conference as a "milestone" in the struggle against imperialism and reaction. Commentaries tailored for individual radio audiences included broadcasts in Arabic highlighting the attacks at the meeting on the "Israeli aggressors."

PROPAGANDA In the period following the Czechoslovak invasion,
BACKGROUND Soviet apprehensions that a third nonalined summit
might serve as a forum for criticism of Warsaw Pact
countries had been reflected most notably in a 4 October 1968
PRAVDA UKRAINY attack on Yugoslavia: "As is known, the Yugoslav
leaders fight for a 'policy of nonalinement.' But if one follows
the position of leadership of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia, it becomes obvious that this is a position of
alinement not with socialism but with the antisocialist forces
in Czechoslovakia." In a speech on 20 October 1968, as reported

COMPTDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 27 -

by Radio Belgrade, Tito observed that the idea of a new nonalined summit was not well received among communist countries and alleged that "efforts were being made in all fields—in Africa, Asia, and so on—to convince people that this is a futile course. . . . This means that statesmen and responsible people abroad are being persuaded to prevent such a meeting."

The nonalinement issue dropped out of Soviet comment in the wake of the subsequent propaganda standdown between Belgrade and Moscow on the issue of Czechoslovakia, but Soviet comment just prior to the Lusaka meeting expressed some concern that the meeting might be diverted from its "anti-imperialist" course by Western machinations. Thus an article in PRAVDA on 3 September defined true nonalinement as favoring of peace and disarmament and opposing racism, colonialism, and neocolonialism. PRAVDA went on to warn against "imperialist" attempts to set the nonalined states against each other and to frustrate attempts to prevent the seating of representatives of national liberation movements. In a similar vein, an article in IZVESTIYA on 30 August cautioned against attempts by the "imperialists" to "substitute their 'theories' and 'doctmines' designed to split and demoralize the nonalinement movement, tearing it away from its natural allies and friends and emasculating its anti-imperialist, anticolonialist essence."

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030039-0

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIG TRENDG 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 28 -

CHINESE UN SEAT

PEOPLE'S DAILY CITES LUSAKA SUPPORT FOR PRC MEMBERSHIP

In line with Peking's practice during the past year of periodically expressing appreciation for foreign support of the PRC's being seated in the United Nations, a 14 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial claims that such support was widespread at the Lusaka nonalined conference. It expresses "heartfelt thanks for the just stand" taken by "the delegates of many countries" who stated that the PRC "must be restored of its legitimate rights in the UN."* Other Chinese propaganda on the Lusaka conference included a 9 September NCNA item which cited Zambian President Kaunda's demand in his opening speech that "the legitimate rights be restored to the PRC in the UN" and his comment that exclusion of the PRC is "a blunder." On the 11th NCNA reported that "many delegates" had made such a demand, citing specifically the comments of the delegates from Sudan, Congo (Brazzaville), Nepal, Southern Yemen, and Mauritania.

Moscow comment on the Lusaka conference did not mention the discussion of the PRC membership question, and TASS' 11 September report on the conference decisions omitted mention of the resolution—reported by Belgrade's TANYUG on 10 September—advocating the universality of the UN and demanding that the PRC "be given the place which belongs to it."

In recent weeks NCNA had continued to cite expressions of appreciation extended by Chinese officials, including Li Hsien-nien and Lo Kuei-po, at official banquets and receptions in Peking and abroad.** The joint communique issued on 14 August at the conclusion of a Southern Yemen delegation's visit to the PRC took note of the Chinese side's gratitude to the Southern Yemeni Government for "consistently supporting the restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the UN." And NCNA on 20 June cited similar support in a joint Sudan-Yugoslav communique released at the conclusion of the visit of the president of the Sudanese Revolutionary Council to Yugoslavia.

^{*} Since 1967 Peking has backed away from the notion of establishing a "new revolutionary United Nations" and has not reiterated its disavowal of interest in UN membership. For a report of recent propaganda and a brief backgrounder on the UN issue, see the TRENDS of 10 June 1970, pages 21-22.

^{**} On these state occasions the governments of France and such third-world nations as Ceylon, Afghanistan, Nepal, Iraq, Congo (Brazzaville), and Mauritania were thanked for supporting: PRC membership in the UN.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 29 -

Peking has not called for "expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique" since Kuo Mo-jo made this demand on 11 March, at a PRC-Pakistan Friendship Association banquet in Karachi. But the Chinese ambassador to Afghanistan, at a Kabul reception on 27 August marking the 10th anniversary of the signing of the PRC-Afghanistan friendship treaty, thanked that government for supporting the PRC's claim and for opposing "the intrigues of creating 'two Chinas.'" On 8 September NCNA quoted the Ceylon economic delegation head's charges that the UN has made itself "a mockery" by barring the country which has the largest population in the world and that it is "a bigger farce" that China is represented in the United Nations "by a little island which is a puppet of the imperialist and neocolonialist forces." "To us there is only one China," the Ceylon delegate remarked, "and that is the People's Republic of China."

FRG RELATIONS WITH BLOC

MOSCOW SAYS CDU/CSU CHANGES TACTICS ON TREATY WITH USSR

In contrast to earlier broad-brush indictment of the CDU/CSU as an opponent of the 12 August FRG-Soviet treaty, Moscow's comment has increasingly focused on differences of attitude within this West German political bloc. On 28 August, an article in PRAVDA by Grigoryev said that "two basic view-points" had emer ad in the CDU/CSU--a "weit-and-see viewpoint" as expressed in a leadership statement of the CDU and "the uncompromisingly negative line of Kiesinger, Strauss, and Guttenberg, which is accompanied by chauvinistic slogans." Subsequent propaganda took up the theme with a penelist in the 6 September domestic service commentators' roundtable suggesting that Kiesinger faces a possible loss of his party chairmanship because of his "negative attitude" toward the accord and toward European security.

TASS correspondent Borisov, in a commentary on 11 September, says West German "observers" have noted a change in the "tactical line" of the CDU/CSU, necessitated by a fear that opposition to the treaty could mean isolation and a loss of votes. Observing that CDU/CSU parliamentary leader Barzel's recent trip to Paris, London, and Washington gained no support from these capitals for the CDU objections to the treaty, Borisov goes on to cite the West German press for the view that the results of the trip "probably strengthened the preparedness for a businesslike discussion" within the CDU/CSU.

Another TASS commentary on the 11th, by Orlov, also concludes that fear of political isolation has forced the CDU/CSU "to resort to more complicated maneuvers." Citing CDU spokesman Schroeder's "recent recommendation" that his party not interpret the treaty as aimed against the FRG, Orlov says "observers" have viewed this statement as an example of CDU efforts to convince the public that the party is "shocked by the too open and coarse campaign being conducted" by CSU leader Strauss against the agreement.

PEKING Peking's first, belated comment on the FRG-Soviet COMMENT treaty comes in a 12 September NCNA commentary denouncing the accord as a "big fraud," followed promptly by an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article labeling it a "component part of the diabolic 'global Munich.'"

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 31 -

PEOPLE'S DAILY indicts the accord on four counts in keeping with Peking's long-standing propaganda position on Moscow's policy vis-a-vis Germany and Europe: the treaty "betrays" the sovereignty of the GDR and the interests of the Soviet people, encourages West German "militarism," shows the "craftiness" of Brandt, and works to the detriment of peace and security in Europe.

In documenting the charge of betrayal, the Commentator article and the NCNA commentary both say that concessions were made on the Eerlin question—including the matter of access—and that Moscow accepted a letter from the West German Government reiterating its intention to "recover German unity." Moscow has not "dared" to make this letter public, Commentator says, calling this failure evidence of "guilty conscience."*

WARSAW REPORTS DELAY IN NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH BONN

Warsaw's first acknowledgment of Bonn's request for a delay in the opening of the sixth round of the FRG-Polish talks on normalizing relations appeared in a brief domestic service report on 10 September. The communique on the previous round of talks (in Warsaw, 23-25 July) had noted that the delegations would meet again in early September in Bonn.

The Polish radio report says that the FRG Government "justified" its request for a delay "by the desire to obtain greater support for the planned agreement in the Bundestag." FRG Government spokesmen, it adds, have expressed the conviction that the agreement with Poland "will be ready before the end of this year." An article in the next day's ZYCIE WARSZAWY, reviewed by PAP, observes that the reason given for the postponement "seems to be convincing, taking into account the complex processes which are now at work in the political life in Bonn and the alinement of forces in the Bundestag." Restaing the Polish view that a treaty on normalization of relations with the FRG must include a declaration on the final character of the Oder-Neisse line, the article recalls that PZPR First Secretary Gomulka repeated this demand in his 6 September Harvest Day speech in Warsaw.

^{*} See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS for a fuller discussion of the Chinese attack.

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FBIS TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 32 -

A PAP dispatch of 12 September reports that the talks will be held in Bonn "at the beginning of October . . . at the level of vice-ministers." PAP adds that the Polish and FRG governments have agreed that West German Foreign Minister Scheel will come to Warsaw at the beginning of November "in order to finalize . . . the talks" between the two countries. In conclusion, PAP cites a West German Foreign Ministry spokesman as expressing "well-grounded hope that a treaty with Poland could be signed in the autumn of this year." The spokesman said, PAP continues, that from the West German point of view an agreement with Poland "is as important for European policy as the treaty which we have concluded with the Soviet Union."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 33 -

ROMANIA AND BULGARIA

CEAUSESCU, ZHIVKOV EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION

Ceausescu's meeting with Zhivkov in the border towns of Ruse, Bulgaria and Giurgiu, Romania on 11 and 12 September reflects efforts by both sides to submerge their continuing political and ideological differences, exacerbated by the intervention in Czechoslovakia and its aftermath, in the immediate interests of promoting economic cooperation and paving the way for the long-overdue signing of a new bilateral treaty.

As carried by Bucharest's AGERPRES on 12 September, the communique on the talks says the two sides signed protocols on "cooperation and specialization in industrial production" and on "the decision to continue design work" on the Islaz-Somovit hydropower project—a Danube power project of which the Bulgarians have been longtime advocates. There is no elaboration of what the "cooperation and specialization" will entail.

The communique also announces that a Romanian party and government delegation will visit Sofia in November to sign — new friendship treaty replacing the existing 20-year pact, which expired in 1968 and remains in force under the five-year automatic-extension clause.* The belated signing of the new Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty on 7 July of this year appears to have set the pattern and cleared the way for formal renewal of such counterpart Romanian treaties with East European Pact states.

Cryptic generalizations and omissions in the communique serve to paper over the basic differences in approach between Romania on the one hand and Bulgaria as Moscow's spokesman on the other.

^{*} Ceausescu and Premier Maurer sent a message to Zhivkov and President Traykov on the 20th anniversary of the treaty signing, carried in the Bucharest domestic service on 16 January 1968, which declared that fraternal relations between Romania and Bulgaria would "gain new expression by the forthcoming renewal" of the treaty. The Czechoslovak events intervened, and the year passed with no further reference to renewal of the pact.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 34 -

Although the two delegations are said specifically to have been on the party as well as state level, the document is notably devoid of any definition of the basis of interparty relations: there is no reference either to proletarian internationalism or to the Romanian formula on independence, equality, and noninterference. Nor is there any mention of the Warsaw Pact or CEMA.

Describing the atmosphere of the talks as one of "friendship and collaboration," the communique states cryptically that the two sides "exchanged views" on "some problems of the present international situation." It mentions no specific problems, merely recording both sides' resolve to contribute "to a climate of collaboration and security in the Balkans, in Europe, and throughout the world." The reference to security in the Balkans accommodates--but also obfuscates--the Romanian initiative, included in a letter to UN Secretary General U Thant on 13 June of this year, for intensified efforts "by all governments concerned for the wide development of interstate relations in the Balkan region, for the turning of this area into a zone of peace, of peaceful coexistence, into a region free from nuclear weapons." AGERPRES had carried the text of the letter on the date of issue. Soviet media did not publicize it.

BULGARIAN In a tacit but pointed counter to Romania's view ARMY PAPER of Europe and the Balkans, an article on the Zhivkov-Ceausescu talks in the Bulgarian Defense Ministry organ NARODNYA ARMIYA on 13 September underscores the proper view of multilateral cooperation in Europe and the Balkans for a Soviet ally--cooperation under Moscow's aegis within the disciplined framework of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact.

As if to compensate for the absence of any reference to either organization in the communique on the talks, the article repeatedly emphasizes both as the framework for Bulgarian-Romanian cooperation. It traces the two countries' international importance to their pursuit within the Pact of a "policy of peace, Balkan understanding, and European security." It observes that they have both become developed socialist states "through the generous and selfless assistance of the USSR and in close cooperation with CEMA." And it concludes that the Ceausescu-Zhivkov talks demonstrate mutual resolve "to march firmly and unwaveringly toward the common goal: the building of communism in close and unbreakable unity with the great Soviet Union and other socialist countries, members of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

~ 35 **–**

SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY

PRAGUE BELATEDLY REBUTS ATTACK ON DUBCEK OUSTER

Having already engaged in polemical exchanges with the Italian and British parties over their continuing censure of the August 1968 intervention and their opposition to the repressive measures taken by the Husak regime, Prague takes up the cudgels against yet another party that has persisted in outspoken criticism of the invasion and its aftermath. Reacting tardily to an article in the Spanish CP organ MUNDO OBRERO, broadcast by the party's clandestine Radio Espana Independiente on 10 July,* the Czech party bureau's TRIBUNA on 9 September carried an article angrily rebutting MUNDO OBRERO's scathing attack on the ouster of Dubcek.

TRIBUNA appears particularly rankled by MUNDO OBRERO's allegation that Dubcek was ousted in contravention of communist party statutes and by its claim that his only offense was his refusal to endorse the Soviet-led invasion. Answering these "absurd" contentions, the Czechoslovak article insists that Dubcek's "opportunist and revisionist" activity was "at absolute variance with Czechoslovak Communist Party statutes" and that far from being ousted because he opposed the intervention, he was responsible for creating the threat to "the revolutionary achievements of socialism" which required the "socialist allies" to intervene.

As summarized by CTK on 10 September, the TRIBUNA article calls MUNDO OBRERO's charges "an unusual interference in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Communist Party." It also accuses MUNDO OBRERO of contributing to "the disorientation of Spanish communists" on the Czechoslovak situation, and it goes on to suggest that the party is being misled by people in its own ranks who have close ties to Czechoslovak reformist elements. Many Spanish communists, it complains, "accept tendentious information spread obviously by some representatives of the Spanish CP who have lived or live in Czechoslovakia and whose contacts with rightist opportunist representatives in Czechoslovakia were very close and based on solidarity."

^{*} For a discussion of the MUNDO OBRERO article see the TRENDS of 15 July 1970, pages 29-30.

- 36 -

In earlier attacks on the Italian and British parties, Prague media had suggested that these parties' views on Czechoslovakia might have been influenced by "bourgeois propaganda" and by statements of Czechoslovak exiles, but there was no suggestion of direct ties with Czechoslovak "rightists." CTK's summary of the TRIBUNA article does not refer to the Italian or British party censure of Dubcek's expulsion, but a TANYUG summary of the article on the 9th reports that it indicts Western communists for circulating misinformation about Czechoslovakia, charging that they "sometimes take over arguments from bourgeois propaganda, renegades, and various outcasts."

CTK does quote an admonition in TRIBUNA that seems directed broadly at parties which continue to be critical of Prague developments and implies that parties like the Spanish and Italian, which couple continuing attacks on the Czechoslovak regime with disclaimers of anti-Sovietism, are guilty of an intolerable ideological neutralism. Lecturing that "it is impossible to sit between two chairs," TRIBUNA says this precept is "part of the basic alphabet of Marxism-Leninism which is required today to grasp the very essence of the world divided along class lines."

CZECH REBUTTAL FOLLOWS SUCCESSION OF SPANISH CP CRITICISMS

Prague had ignored MUNDO OBRERO's blast at the Dubcek ouster when it was first publicized by the Spanish communist clandestine radio in July, in keeping with a propaganda line that sought to picture criticisms of the Czechoslovak events as on the wane. Five days after Espana Independiente broadcast the MUNDO OBRERO article, RUDE PRAVO expressed gratification that "many communist parties in the capitalist countries are reevaluating their past stand" and that "even circles not favorably inclined toward us recognize the successes of the new party leadership in the normalization efforts in the past year." RUDE PRAVO's comment was in line with the optimistic prognosis of Czechoslovak CP Central Committee Secretary Vasil Bilak, who declared in a radio interview on 11 June: "We believe that gradually, on the basis of knowledge of the objective factors of the post-January developments, on the basis of our analyses, the fraternal parties will revise their different standpoints and attitudes to the Czechoslovak CP and to the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 37 -

But the Spanish party continued to criticize Prague's actions. Radlo Espana Independiente* on 31 August carried a commentary censuring the Husak regime for depriving former Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Artur London of his nationality because of the publication of his book "The Confession," an expose of the use of false confessions in the 1952 Slansky trial. The radio observed that London was being deprived of his nationality for the second time, the first having occurred when he was sentenced in 1952 in connection with the Slansky trial. It noted that his original trial had been "declared illegal even by the present leadership of the Czechoslovak CP" and that he had been rehabilitated and decorated by the government in 1968. The current action against him, it said, was a "manifestation of certain methods that should not now exist in the international communist movement." Espana Independiente granted that the London case was essentially Czechoslovakia's affair but claimed a right to discuss it because London had fought with the International Brigade in Spain. The radio also argued that "the general interests of socialism" were damaged by Prague's censure of someone who had merely referred publicly to events the regime itself had branded illegal.

The Spanish party has also reasserted the rectitude of its initial condemnation of the August 1968 invasion. A 22 August Espana Independiente commentary marking the second anniversary of the invasion declared that the Soviet bloc action "made a socialist people, a friend of the USSR, lose its confidence in its communist party and run the risk of being won over by anti-Sovietism." The "paradoxical" result, it alleged, is "a socialist power in Czechoslovakia that has not got the decisive support of its people but relies on the intervention force of another socialist state."

The broadcast went on to stress the damage the invasion caused "to the communist cause in the capitalist countries," charging that it demoralized communist allies and potential allies in

^{*} On the air since 1941 as the oldest of the communist clandestine radios, Espana Independiente currently broadcasts a total of 71 hours 45 minutes a week. There is evidence that one 20-minute daily segment emanates from a Budapest transmitter and that the remainder or the broadcasts originate in Romania.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIG TRENDG 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 38 -

countries where communist parties "approved" the intervention. While recalling the high-level CPSU-Spanish CP meeting last April which "showed that there is more uniting us than dividing us," and while avowing that the existence of interparty differences would not preclude amicable relations "at least as far as the Spanish CP is concerned," the commentary made it clear that the party has no intention of altering its position on Czechoslovakia for the sake of improving relations with Moscow and its allies:

The Spanish CP thinks that to enjoy the support of the masses the communists must maintain an independent policy on problems that directly affect their character as a national and deeply internationalist party. The Spanish CP believes in maintaining relations of friendship and cooperation with all communist parties and all the socialist countries, regardless of their position in the present polemic, on the bases of internationalism and nonintervention in the internal affairs of any party and any country. . . The Spanish CP has taken its position on the Czechoslovak events, a position which it still maintains, for the facts show that it is right.

CRITIQUE OF Like the Italian CP, with which it maintains STALINISM close ties, the Spanish party has extended its anti-Soviet stance to the ideological sphere, condemning Stalinism and its after-effects and contrasting it with the exemplary features of Leninism. Thus an article in the party theoretical organ entitled "Ideological Problem and the Cultural Front" by E. Marti, broadcast in installments by Radio Espana Independiente on 18 and 25 August and 1 September, lamented that the communist movement is "not fully facing the complex problems that arose in the course of building socialism and displays important shortcomings in the ideological struggle." Seeking reasons for the communist movement's "long period of ideological stagnation," Marti noted that while under Lenin "there was no liquidation of communists or monolithism, just a struggle of ideas" at a time of maximum "increase in the class struggle," Stalin justified "monolithism" and party purges by claiming that the class struggle intensified as the building of socialism progressed.

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

~ 39 ~

Recalling Stalin's successful effort to concentrate power in his own hands and the conversion of the CPSU and other parties into "executive organs in the service of initiatives emanating from above," Marti concluded that "all these features of Stalinism sterilized the communist movement considerably from the theoretical viewpoint." The solution, he indicated, lay in ceasing to regard any criticism within the communist movement as inherently subversive:

Revolutionary criticism must . . . examine and explain the problems of the socialist community without fear of the way that the enemy uses these questions, because we are in a situation in which adverse propaganda is more harmful the less we are able to provide a rational and Marxist explanation of these phenomena.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS 16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 40 -

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PROVINCES URGE DRIVE FOR ECONOMIC GAINS TO GREET NPC

Provincial broadcasts have provided wide followup publicity for the communique of the Central Committee plenum, including its reference to "necessary preparations" for convening the National People's Congress (NPC) "at an appropriate time." But the broadcasts give no definite indicator as to when the NPC may meet.

Canton radio on 11 September did call for fighting "a big battle for four months, in order to fulfill or overfulfill Kwangtung's national economic plan this year and to welcome the convening of the fourth NPC." Other provincial radios have stressed the need to strive for economic achievements to greet the NPC but have not linked the four remaining months of this year's economic plan to the convening of the NPC. Earlier, on the 8th, before the communique was released, Canton radio called for a struggle during "the four months left before the end of this year" to fulfill industrial and agricultural targets for Kwangtung.

A few radios have linked the need to fulfill economic tasks simultaneously to National Day (1 October) and the NPC. Changsha on 10 September broadcast a directive on studying the communique from the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee; it urged the swift accomplishment of economic tasks "to greet the convening of the nation's fourth NPC and the 21st anniversary of National Day." Similar phrasing has been monitored from Chekiang, Kiangsu and Tsinghai broadcasts.

INNER MONGOLIA, KWEICHOW, SZECHWAN RADIOS REMAIN SILENT

Three of the PRC's 29 provincial-level radios are still broadcasting no local news. The radios of Inner Mongolia, Kweichow and Szechwan continue to relay Radio Peking throughout the broadcast day except for local weather reports and other brief announcements of a nonpolitical nature. The other 26 radios relay Peking for only a portion of the broadcast day; each of them also originates local news and comment—for a minimum of one hour, in the case of Tientsin, to two—three hours for the majority.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 SEPTEMBER 1970

- 41 -

The three radios that are broadcasting no local news are approaching the first anniversary of their awkward silence. The Kweichow radio ceased broadcasting local news on 30 September 1969, the Szechwan radio on 19 November 1969, and the Inner Mongolia radio on 5 January 1970.

"News" dispatches on these blacked-out areas can, of course, be distributed by Peking, via the medium of NCNA. A fair number of such dispatches are publicized in regard to Inner Mongolia. There are very few in the case of Szechwan, and even fewer for Kweichow, the "spring thunder in the Southwest" province that attracted much attention at the peak of the cultural revolution.